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Abstract 
 
The EU-SA Strategic Partnership (SP) has entered its 10th year. It is a product of its time and 
particular regional and international circumstances. These having changed somewhat over the 
course of the last decade, it is not surprising that the dynamics of the relationship, expressed 
through the strategic partnership’s parameters, have undergone commensurate changes. Based 
on the recognition that the partnership is between a multilateral institution and a state, the 
difference in their respective strategic positions is inevitable. The challenge therefore, is for the 
EU-SA Strategic Partnership to maintain a flexibility that allows for continued contestation, 
development and relevance. This paper reviews the historical context of the partnership  and 
the challenging dynamics that have evolved over the lifespan of partnership, providing the basis 
for the thematic discussion which follow in this issue. The analysis in this article demonstrates 
that in spite of acknowledged challenges, the functionality of the strategic partnership based on 
persisting interests remains intact.  
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Introduction 
The historical relationship between Europe and South Africa is a long one. It is a history that 
incorporates changes in the international system even as there were dramatic developments 
within Europe, including institutional changes that saw the European Economic Community 
evolve into the European Union (EU) finalised through the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, as well as 
South Africa’s transformation from apartheid to a post-apartheid democratic state in the mid-
1990s. It is natural that the relationship between the EU and South Africa, ‘strategised’ in 2006 
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and operationalised in the Joint Action Plan (JAP) of 2007, should undergo stages of 
reorientation and, at times, contestation. This speaks of a relationship that is dynamic and 
should not be seen as an indication that it is failing in times of difficulty.  Rather, it can be 
taken as a sign of natural growth in the relationship between the EU and South Africa. 
The EEC/EU, as an active anti-apartheid supporter during South Africa’s struggle years and 
ensuing transition to democracy, has remained a committed partner and influence through 
South Africa’s socio-political and economic transformation. South Africa’s relationship with 
the EU, and its role in the strategic partnership (SP), is further the product of a unique history 
and a specific set of circumstances. It is this aspect that is largely overlooked when reviewing 
the relationship’s development and the current state of affairs. It should not be considered 
surprising that, as circumstances change, so too does the partnership. It is this change that 
requires a critical assessment of the ‘strategic’ element of the partnership in light of 
contemporary regional and global dynamics. 
This article reviews the EU-SA Strategic Partnership from an understanding of its historical 
context and its developing relevance in light of the changes experienced in both the EU and 
South Africa. The resurgence of pan-Africanism in South African foreign policy and practice, 
together with a perceived anti-west narrative, impact on the evolving dynamics that affect the 
partnership. While on the surface it may appear that these aspects jeopardise the strategic 
partnership, the reality, it is here contended, is that the functioning of the strategic partnership 
remains intact, based on persisting interests.  
The challenge for both the EU and South Africa going forward is for the partnership to remain 
relevant in changing times, and to accommodate, as far as possible, the needs of both partners 
in their respective roles – for the EU, as a regional organisation representing a number of 
member states but facing great change in the period following the ‘Brexit’ vote by the UK to 
withdraw from the union, and for South Africa, as a leading African state on a continent facing 
several challenges in the areas of peace and security, economic development, and global trade 
arrangements. In this sense, ‘strategic’ becomes meaningful to both the EU and South Africa. 
This article focuses on how the strategic partnership came into existence and where it stands 
currently in view of developing dynamics, and forms part of a wider discussion in which the 
subsequent articles evaluate its successes and failures along thematic lines including: 
economic, trade and development, security, and relations within multilateral forums. This has 
necessitated an historical approach, based on empirical analysis. The article is set out in three 
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main parts. The first section will present an historical overview of the relationship between the 
EEC/EU and South Africa and the establishment of the strategic partnership in 2007. The 
second section will outline the operational and structural elements of the strategic partnership 
informed by the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) of 1999. The third 
section will look at challenges that have emerged over the course of the strategic partnership’s 
lifespan including the 1) differing perceptions of what ‘strategic’ means for either partner; 2) 
diverging worldviews, as South Africa and the EU have realigned themselves to accommodate 
shifts in the surrounding international system, and: 3) differences over the extent to which 
either partner may dictate the terms of the partnership. The last is based on the EU’s 2013 
decision to reclassify South Africa as a middle income country (MIC) and commensurately 
withdraw financial assistance.  
In providing the historical context the analysis draws particularly on primary sources, such as 
the founding documents of the EU-South African Strategic Partnership, the JAP of 2007, Joint 
Summit Declarations from 2008-2013 (2013 being the last one at the point of writing), and 
minutes from ministerial dialogues and meetings of the Joint Cooperation Council (2008-
2016). Speeches by the South African deputy minister and minister for International Relations 
and Cooperation, as well as speeches by the various EU ambassadors to South Africa were also 
considered. Unstructured non-attributable interviews were conducted between March and June 
of 2016 (prior to the UK referendum and ‘Brexit’), both with representatives of the South 
African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and those of the EU 
delegation to South Africa.  
 
Historical	background	
 
The signing of the EU-SA SP coincided with a dovetailing of perspectives between South 
African and the EU.  A neoliberal inspired document, the JAP encapsulated shared values and 
interests that a few years earlier1 would have been almost unthinkable for South Africa.  
At a time when globalisation and its concomitant neoliberal orthodoxy were sweeping the 
world after the end of the Cold War, South Africa’s own path to democracy and the fall of 
apartheid was intertwined with its embracing of free-market ideology. Since the period of the 
mid-1980s, negotiations with powerful business groups within South Africa were seen as key 
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to a peaceful transition.2 Influential ‘Western’ governments were also keen to promote the new 
economic orthodoxy, promising an influx of foreign investment under the condition of its 
adoption by the incoming government.3 It was deemed imperative by ANC leaders at the time 
to ‘assure’ both groups that business would continue as usual in order to avoid a feared exodus 
of capital from South Africa, as well as internal insurrection from extremist groups and to 
warrant the promises of foreign investment.4  
South Africa’s own path from the ANC’s negotiations in exile, and its eventual backing by the 
EEC/EU (even with its detractors5) were incremental steps towards the EU-SA SP. Business 
interests played a significant part in bringing about the downfall of the apartheid system, the 
ANC’s rise to government, and the particular social, economic developmental path that was 
then followed.6 
In 1993 South Africa signed up to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility.  
However, up until 1993, nationalisation and a model of social and economic development 
broadly based on Marxist and Leninist philosophy characterised the development strategy of 
the ANC government in waiting.7 The Reconstruction and Development Plan, initially put 
forward by the Congress of South African Trade Unions, was redrafted several times, having 
been vetted by the IMF, the World Bank, as well as the governments of the UK, Germany, the 
US, France, and Japan.8  Only then was it deemed fit to be introduced as a central policy vision 
of the nascent ANC-led government.  
Just prior to this, parties to the joint action decisions in the negotiations of the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU, also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty), identified South Africa as 
one of five countries targeted for assistance in strategic areas.9 Mainly focused on electoral 
support but also including a bilateral economic framework, the joint action decision was 
centred on the Special Programme of Development Assistance, which importantly established 
a long-term outlook aimed at supporting democracy building in the new South Africa.10  
At the time of the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the EU began its official 
presence in Pretoria. An interim cooperation agreement between the EU and South Africa was 
signed in the same year, which combined economic and financial assistance designed to 
maintain established relations.11 External to the Lomé Convention framework, which governed 
relations between Europe and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) states between 1975 
and 2000 when it was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement, the interim cooperation agreement 
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included a commitment to the observation of human rights as part of the EU’s positive 
conditionality used to enforce its normative values abroad, and then part of its  new approach 
to externalised engagement under the TEU of 1992.12  
For EU-SA relations, 1995 was a particularly dynamic year. By then, Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki, who was at that time directing the socio-economic path that South Africa would take,13 
began preparing a growth-driven economic strategy later known as the Growth Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) model.14 This was accepted by the ANC at their national 
conference a year later.  At the same time, South Africa began negotiations on a bilateral basis 
with the EU that would lead to the signing of the TDCA. 
There were 24 rounds of negotiations leading up to the signing of the TDCA in 1999,15 which 
included various attempts by South Africa to gain trade preferences under the Lomé 
Convention as a developing state. Rejected several times for a variety of reasons,16 South 
Africa eventually received extended limited participation from the EU which excluded access 
to funding under the Lomé Convention but offered, instead, a free trade agreement (FTA). 
South Africa, under the partial membership of the Lomé Convention, was also allowed to 
tender for contracts under the European Development Fund in all ACP countries.17   
The FTA, which was to become an important part of the eventual TDCA between the EU and 
South Africa, was by no means agreed to easily, and has remained even under the current trade 
regime with the EU a sensitive point.18 The initial offer made by the EU in 1995 was rejected 
by the South African government, as was a subsequent EU negotiating mandate offered in 
March 1996.19 Negotiations between the EU and South Africa resumed again only in 1997 with 
South Africa’s proposal of the TDCA. After this point, the Lomé Convention was offered to 
South Africa under a separate protocol, with a loose commitment to reach an agreement at 
‘some point in the future’.20  
The evolution of the EEC into the EU in the early 1990s was responsible for the promotion of 
strategic partnerships in general and the EU-SA SP in particular. Engagement with South 
Africa and the willingness to develop special relations was an extension of EU assistance for 
the nascent democracy. As far back as the joint action decision in 1992, South Africa had been 
deemed of geopolitical strategic importance to the EU; its role in sub-Saharan Africa of notable 
significance.21 
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In November of 1996 the EU Commission presented a green paper on the future of relations 
between the EU and the ACP countries, contemplating the ‘splitting up’ of the Lomé 
Convention into regional agreements. South Africa was singled out as a potential ‘bilateral’ 
partner with acknowledged regional (strategic) strength and influence.22  
The GEAR model was presented at the same time that the EU launched its Programme for 
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) with South Africa, within which the country strategy 
papers (based on a seven-year financial cycle) and the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
(MIP) provided a focus on specific areas, a focus which has changed over time.23  
In 1997, at the time of the signing of a scientific agreement between the EU and South Africa, 
Pretoria presented a position paper on a proposed EU-SA TDCA.24 The TDCA became official 
agreement in 1999,25 the same year Thabo Mbeki became president. On the basis of the TDCA, 
the JAP founding the EU-SA SP would later outline ‘mutually’ shared values that included ‘the 
economic principles of a social market economy, free and fair trade and [an] equitable 
international economic order’,26 aspects strongly associated with neoliberal economic thought 
popular at the time. 
September 11, 2001 was a turning point in global perspectives on security challenges.27 In 2003 
the European Security Strategy (ESS) outlined ‘strategic partnerships’ as part of its new 
approach to global security,28 in which these partnerships were identified as part of a network 
of strategic relationships with influential states, through which regional and continental (in the 
case of Africa) relations and roles could be coordinated.   
Structure	and	mechanics	of	the	partnership	
 
As noted above, the foundation for the EU-SA SP has existed in the TDCA since 1999, 
amended in 2004, and forms its ‘legal basis’. As the name of the agreement suggests the 
partnership is organised around two main themes – trade and cooperation.  The TDCA thus 
forms the central organising principle and point of departure for all EU-SA SP relations, 
providing the structure for the development of the subsequent strategic partnership formalised 
in 2007.  
The TDCA itself is organised into four areas or ‘pillars’: 1) political dialogue, 2) trade, 3) 
economic and other issues, and 4) development cooperation29. As a trade framework, the 
TDCA is primarily focused on economic matters, however since the advent of the strategic 
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partnership, the TDCA sections addressing ‘other issues’ and political cooperation have filled 
out substantially.  As a result, much of the focus has shifted away from the TDCA itself, 
redirected to the significance of the strategic partnership.   
The strategic partnership is designed to be coherent within the larger EU-Africa strategy also 
introduced in 2007, and in this sense – as indicated in most summit communiqués and Joint 
Cooperation Council (JCC) minutes – there is a ‘strategic’ fit in the partners’ efforts to establish 
peace, stability and prosperity, aims declared to be ‘shared’ in the JAP.  
The Joint Action Plan of 2007 framed and orientated cooperation between South Africa and 
the EU under the strategic partnership. The JAP has two ‘strands’, the first being high-level or 
enhanced political dialogue using a summitry structure (troika format30), and a second strand 
dedicated to functional dialogue forums focused on economic, social, and ‘other areas’. The 
Mogobagoba31  Dialogue was the name given to the over-arching framework for all areas of 
cooperation,32 comprising meetings of the JCC,33 which oversees the implementation of the 
TCDA and the partnership; a ministerial political dialogue (normally coinciding with 
summits); and high-level summits.34 Ministerial political dialogue, according to the JAP,35 was 
meant to take place twice a year, and the high-level summits on a ‘regular’ basis. Up until 2013, 
summits occurred each year, while there have been four  ministerial troika meetings so far. 
 
The	Mogobagoba	Dialogue		
Under the auspices of the Mogabagoba Dialogue, , the partners engage in ‘high-level’ political 
dialogue in a series of annual summits, ministerial political meetings, senior officials’ meetings 
(including meetings of the Programme Steering Committee  or PSC), and any other ad hoc 
meetings. The second ‘strand’ consists of what is generally regarded as the ‘operational’ level, 
where functional dialogues take place under the four areas noted above. 
However, the high-level political dialogue has encountered some challenges, precluding further 
summits since 2013.36   Political differences between the two partners, particularly regarding 
peace and security as discussed in the article by Hierro in this issue, have rendered high level 
meetings unworkable. South Africa’s foreign policy position as an African state have played a 
major role in this, together with its ‘emerging’ personality and ‘muscle-flexing’ as both a 
‘strategic’ role-player on the continent and in international forums.  
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Indeed, since 2007, only two meetings have taken place between the EU’s Peace and Security 
Committee and South Africa.37 South Africa’s positions on Libya, Syria, Zimbabwe, and more 
recently on the International Criminal Court have driven high-level divisions.38 This has not, 
however, stopped other political dialogue and functional level meetings from taking place, such 
as the 14th JCC meeting (November, 2014), the 13th Ministerial Political Dialogue (February, 
2016), and the 22nd and 23rd EU-SA Inter-Parliamentary Meetings held in Cape Town and 
Strasberg respectively (2015 and 2016). However, the summit scheduled for late 2016 did not 
take place.  
The funding for the operationalisation and facilitation of the dialogues was set up in 2010,39 
under the umbrella of the TDCA Dialogue Facility or TDCA-F,40 through the development 
cooperation instrument. Funding comes from both South Africa and the EU.41 The Dialogue 
Facility performs general ‘facilitative techniques’, such as mentoring and coaching as part of 
its array of technical assistance, which also includes ‘niche initiative’ research and logistics 
funding, ad hoc short-term expertise sourcing, as well as service and framework contracts, for 
example.42 It also provides ‘seed money’43 or logistical support such as travel expenses for 
‘study tours’ (where best practices may be exchanged), conferences, and workshop funding.44 
Proposals for funding are submitted according to certain criteria, under sector dialogue areas.45 
The Programme Steering Committee, which oversees project acceptance, compliancy and 
funding, is made up of members of the EU delegation alongside South African diplomats from 
DIRCO.46 Areas of dialogue are South African driven47 through the identification of projects48 
(defined by the areas of cooperation set out in the JAP), which are then elevated to dialogues 
and subsequent South African policy directives.49 This could change, however, as a 
recommendation by the Dialogue Facility50 has been made for increasing the role of the 
steering committee to become an ‘agenda-setter’, as well as having a monitoring and evaluative 
role in future.51 Autonomous agenda setting may always be out of reach, however, especially 
in some issue areas of the partnership observed to be under tighter governmental restrictions, 
such as trade.52  
The dialogue process is not as straightforward a task as it might appear, as  the EU 
administrative structure differs from that of the South African government. For example, at the 
11th JCC meeting in 2010, four EU Directorate Generals were present with their staff (23 
people), while on the South African side there were nine departments (45 people).53 There is 
also a more direct line of empowered decision-making in the EU, where the ambassador has 
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an extensive degree of autonomy in decision making.54 However, on more than one occasion, 
the ministerial meetings have referred to the EUs non-competencies for dealing with certain 
requests.55 
While demand for areas or projects may be South African driven, a mid-term summary report 
from 2014 drew attention to the lack of dialogue taking place in some sectors. This it attributed 
to South Africa’s ‘limited systemic capacity-building support’.56 Agenda setting within the 
dialogue structure is meant to be mutual. It is the dialogue facility, however, that would 
logically exert a greater degree of influence on choosing which mentors, expert reports, 
twinning(s), and peer-to-peer engagement given its institutionalised mandate and capacity.57   
Further, more established dialogues are acknowledged to be already in a state of considerable 
institutionalisation, to the point where they could become self-sustaining,58 although not 
without continued support from the Dialogue Facility and its extension. The Dialogue Facility, 
in its present form, runs the real risk of becoming indispensable to the relationship between 
South Africa and the EU, thus institutionalising dependency.  In addition, the implication  that 
South Africa lacks the capacity to initiate and continue dialogue without the assistance of such 
a facility59 raises concerns of increased dependency on outsourced ‘diplomacy’ at a time when 
others are pointing to a dearth in professional diplomacy in South Africa.60  
However, if acknowledged and taken on board by Pretoria, the identification by the Dialogue 
Facility of South Africa’s ‘limited systemic capacity’ (or resources to initiate dialogues in new 
areas61), is an important point that could assist in prompting the focussed development of a 
more professionalised diplomatic core with expertise in strategic partnerships of this kind.62  
This perceived lack of capacity may be partially attributed to the turnover of members of the 
Programme Steering Committee: both EU diplomats and South African civil servants and 
diplomats at DIRCO regularly move posts, diminishing ease of interpersonal exchanges. This 
was an aspect identified by one respondent as particularly damaging to continuity and trust.63  
Under these circumstances the Dialogue Facility has provided the wherewithal to conduct, 
strengthen, and maintain the relationship between the EU and South Africa, and to highlight 
perceived non-capacities in certain areas. It also ensures that even if relations deteriorate, there 
still exists an institutionalised independent circuitry through which communication may be 
continued: in spite of certain recent political ‘hiccups’ between the EU and South Africa. The 
operational aspect of the strategic partnership has been maintained through the Dialogue 
10 
 
Facility, with good intentions on both sides at this level and an almost passionate belief in the 
value of the mutual interaction.64 
Under the auspices of the Dialogue Facility, since 2007, 21 dialogues have been initiated with 
various degrees of success.65 The South African Revenue Service (SARS)/Customs and 
Science and Technology/(Department of Science and Technology) dialogue, for example, 
appears to have a strong institutionalised relationship, and is considered to have long-term 
potential.66 Relevance or impact assessment has been gauged based on the number of mentions 
the various dialogues received at summit level, or JCC meetings.67 Table 1 shows the areas of 
cooperation according to the mid-term executive summary report. The most active, according 
to this report, are science and technology , information, communication and technology  and 
education and training. The Dialogue Facility has identified possible sectors where future 
dialogues could be developed, such as cross cutting issues of gender and natural resources, as 
well as under the employment/social affairs sector.68 However, both the summit and JCC 
meetings show more activities taking place in other areas, such as human rights, regional 
integration and transport, and space. 
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Table 1   
24 Bilateral Dialogues listed under the Mid-Term Evaluation/ Dialogue Facility TDCA-F with corresponding Titles as per the Joint Action Plan of 2007 
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Source: information taken from Healy FE & du Pisani J, Mid-Term Evaluation of the Trade Development Co-operation Agreement Facility (TDCA-F) Letter of Contract No 
2013/330634 –Version 1, Final Report Executive Summary, 2014,p.6, and the Joint Action Plan 2007
POLITICAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION OTHER AREAS TRADE
TITLE I TITLE IV TITLE VI TITLE II & III
PEACE & SECURITY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HEALTH SARS
KIMBERLEY 
PROCESS
NATIONAL INNOVATION 
POLICY
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
CONFERENCE
AUTHORISED 
EOCNOMIC 
OPERATIONS
TRILATERAL PEACE 
& SECURITY 
PROJECT
RESEARCH 
INFRASTRUCTURE ROAD 
MAP (RIRM) INSTITUTE OF REGULATORY SCIENCE RULES OF ORIGIN
SET‐UP OF EUROPEAN 
GEOSTATION IN SA (EGSA) EDUCATION TARIFFS
ENERGY
FURTHER PROFESSIONALISING THE 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION
INCREASE 
RESOURCES IN 3 
COUNTRIES
REGIONAL ENERGY 
CONFERENCE NATIONAL SKILLS PLANNING
ICT
NEW INFRASTRUCTURE SKILLS FOR 
NEW INFRASTRUCTURE JOBS
BROADBAND
TECHNICAL & VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION & TRAINING
DIGITAL TV ENVIRONMENT
E‐SKILLS ROAD TO RIO
GREEN GROWTH
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Challenging	dynamics	in	the	EU‐SA	Strategic	Partnership	
 
Both in interviews undertaken, and in public media statements made by EU representatives in 
South Africa, an emerging divergence of ‘values’ has been noted. The initial vision and ‘shared 
values’ outlined in the JAP form the reference point for this analysis. The divergences that are 
implied herein not only refer to outlook, vision, and (arguably) values, but also to the 
understandings of the term ‘strategic’ and more specifically, what constitutes the strategic 
partnership itself from both a South African viewpoint and an EU one.  
In interpreting the different understandings and approaches, the divergences can be identified 
as between the visceral and the pragmatic; between the ‘high-level’ political positions taken on 
key issues, and the functional decisions reached at the operational level. The articulation of this 
within the workings of the strategic partnership is further distorted, between what is understood 
to be institutional or organisational in nature69 and that which is governmental or state-led. The 
latter, in the case of South Africa, is imbued with an emotionally-loaded history with the EU, 
a body made up of previous colonisers, overlaid with South Africa’s own identity as an African 
state. While this aspect may be long forgotten in the EUs institutional history, it continues to 
inform the contemporary South African narrative.70 Further, the institutional make-up of the 
EU differs significantly from its South African governmental counterpart, to the extent that the 
EUs interpretation of the partnership seems to take place at the ‘higher’ political level, yet 
continues to function at the project or ‘operational’ level. EU personnel appear to have a greater 
degree of autonomy not enjoyed by most South African counterparts at the departmental 
level.71 This aspect may very well contribute to further frustration within the context of the 
partnership.  
 
Anti‐western	narrative	in	contemporary	EU‐South	African	relations:	mutually	
acknowledged	savvy	realism	or	pan‐African	vision?	
 
A paradox has been noted within the strategic partnership based on the observed dichotomy 
between what has euphemistically been referred to as the ‘high political level’, and the 
operational success of the strategic partnership. There are two strands of thought regarding how 
and why this dichotomy has occurred. One is that the EU-SA SP is a valuable lifeline in an 
14 
 
uncertain world that provides stability and support. The other is that the strategic partnership 
provides a unique international relations ‘tool’ that can be pitted and manoeuvred against other 
actors in the global arena.  
The latter finds resonance in the quest for African unity, drawing on the pan-African movement 
and more recently the African Renaissance, all of which offer powerful frameworks for a 
greater South Africa and Africa. It is this narrative in the South African context that has been 
seen to contribute towards a re-orientation away from seeking favour from traditional 
international partners and toward Africa and the global South, in line with the ruling party’s 
ideology.72 There is moreover a marked and significant change in South African policy tone 
and emphasis in the current period, with some advocating values based on Marxist/Leninist 
socio-economic thought once held by the ANC prior to its acceding power.73  
There is a sense among some interviewed in the wider community that anti-West sentiment 
only emerges when it is politically expedient for South Africa domestically and regionally.74 
This is supported by the fact that the Dialogue Facility has throughout these heightened 
political tensions continued to function and, in some areas, function quite well.75 Such an 
instrumental reading, however, of South Africa’s interaction with the EU and the wider 
(Western) international community misses the very nature of the historical relations between 
South Africa, Africa and Europe. The EU in particular seeks to draw on these historical 
relations in the rhetoric used in the preamble to the strategic partnership: these in particular are 
the colonial linkages between African countries and now EU member states, which arguably 
carry both positive and negative associations. 
Many of those interviewed voiced the belief that it is not necessary for the partners to agree on 
everything,76 nor was such agreement expected.77 This could account not only for the 
recognised resilience of the strategic partnership, when judging the complexities of the tensions 
outlined above, but also for the EUs own acknowledgment that it does not take the anti-West 
rhetoric, nor South Africa’s Africanist protestations, to heart. It is worthwhile to remember that 
the EU itself has been inconsistent in applying its policy of negative conditionalities to pursue 
its normative agenda, as noted by critics.78 Under these circumstances the EU would be wise 
to take heed that the fragmentary effects of the TDCA on African regional integration have 
been noted.79 
Strategic	understandings	of	the	partnership	
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The concept of the ‘strategic partnership’ over the 10 years has become sufficiently fluid to 
enable multiple interpretations of it, from either the EU or South Africa. This is perhaps why 
South Africa’s ‘negative’ anti-western rhetoric has, at the operational level, been ignored..   
The antithesis of the aforementioned  worldview, defined as African and ‘South-South’ 
solidarity, could be seen in the EU tradition of socio-economic-political organisation, more 
commonly associated with neoliberalism and based on a dogmatic belief in the free market, 
non-state interference (and the strong legal structure to ensure it), and competition. The JAP of 
2007, it is here argued, is based firmly in this worldview. 
The question at the centre of this analysis involves the nature of what is defined as strategic in 
contemporary global relations.  For the two partners in the EU-SA SP, this definition will be 
informed by varying perspectives arising from their different identities. For the EU, as a 
multilateral institution working on behalf of 28 member states, its perspective is global.80 All 
of its strategic partnerships (and there are 10 of them altogether) are ‘strategic’ in this sense, in 
that (ideally) they are coordinated to ‘work’ together to achieve the EUs goals. The EUs own 
‘policy coherence for development’ constitutes an overall ‘strategic’ approach to global 
affairs.81 
The EUs 10 strategic partnerships must be seen from this perspective, in relation to its own 
interests (which it sees as highly compatible with those of its external partners, in view of the 
‘globalised’ world and the recognition of trans-boundary issues), and also in relation to how it 
sees itself fulfilling these interests with its strategic partners.82 It is entirely logical that its 
strategic partnerships will be differential, accomplishing EU aims more or less depending on 
the particularities and emphases in each, whether these involve greater assistance in peace and 
security matters, financial matters, or trade, for example.  
The EUs worldview and its perspective on strategic relations are reflected in its strategic 
partnership with South Africa, wherein South Africa’s role in other groupings, such as the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russian, India, China, South Africa) and the African Union (AU) – as well as 
in bilateral relations across Africa separate from the AU – are emphasised. In addition, the EU 
perspective must factor in the fact of the Joint Africa EU Strategic (JAES) partnership, and the 
EUs continental approach towards Africa, which was launched at the same time as the Lisbon 
Declaration of 2007. Evidently the EU sees South Africa as a helper, a legitimising force in the 
rest of Africa (for example, using the Development Bank of South Africa to distribute and 
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blend loan payments to other African countries).83 Ironically it is this very aspect of South 
Africa’s strategic importance to the EU that it finds problematic.84  
While the overall perception of ‘strategic’ in regard to its partnership with South Africa may 
not have changed since the signing of the JAP, the way the EU accomplishes its aims has. The 
EU’s internal turmoil, both financial and political, has, required alterations in Brussel’s way of 
interacting and accomplishing its stated aims.  How to accomplish the EU’s objectives abroad 
under these conditions has necessitated different delivery methods, using, for example, 
‘innovation’, ‘risk-taking’, ‘pilot programmes’ and ‘technical assistance’.85 This adjustment in 
how to coordinate and accomplish development aims, initiated as far back as 2007 in the JAP, 
contributes to the understanding of the EU as a calculating, strategising institution. South 
Africa’s pursuit of an Africanist identity under the Zuma administration marks a profound 
departure from the initial circumstances creating the strategic partnership to begin with.86  
To	be	or	not	to	be	an	MIC:	That	has	been	the	question	
 
One issue in particular has caused rancour between the partners in the EU-SA SP: the re-
categorising of South Africa as a middle income country (MIC) in the last Multi-annual 
Indicative Programme for 2013-2020.  This raised concerns and ire87 in Pretoria, mainly 
because South Africa has left out of the decision-making processes, but also perhaps because 
of the apparent marginalisation of South Africa’s particular history and the enduring economic 
inequality among its population. While this latter aspect is still recognised by the EU,88 South 
Africa’s presence in the G20 and at the UN and in other multilateral forums, pushed South 
Africa across the line into the developed, MIC leadership bracket, and has accordingly 
necessitated a change in the EUs perception.  South Africa would no longer receive preferential 
treatment, but would be treated on a reciprocal basis, which also necessitated a reassessment 
of expectations of South Africa’s competencies and responsibilities as an equal partner.89  
The resulting reduction of aid and financial support to South Africa90 has been a contentious 
issue.91 From the EUs perspective, aid support should be viewed pragmatically and not, as had 
been the case, in an emotionally charged, historical way: the EU, after all, is an institution, to 
whose stakeholders (its member states) it is beholden. The EU is the sum of many identities 
operating within the EU institutional structures. Seen from this perspective the complexity of 
its external approach becomes a little clearer, and the ‘problematising’ of EU external relations, 
and hence the tensions outlined, may be more easily appreciated.  
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For the EU it is entirely reasonable, as a multilateral institution, whose ‘business’ is securing 
and stabilising its regional surrounds (that it should be unhappy with lack of progress and 
demand greater ‘return’ from the EU-SA SP. It is also entirely reasonable that in the light of 
reported non-transparency and the inability to keep track of the way in which monies are 
spent,92 the EU is justified in reducing funding to the partnership and find other (possibly more 
qualitative) inventive ways to maximise progress. With this understanding, the EUs 
independent appraisal of its external environment (in this case its partnership with South 
Africa) is reasonable and reflects rational behaviour.  
The partnership has at times become more of a political space of contestation than a business 
forum for mutually beneficial exchange. For the EU at least, this mutually beneficial exchange 
was the original understanding of the strategic partnership, and for the EU the partnership 
remains relevant. Anti-West rhetoric from Pretoria, and its own intractable association with a 
colonial past,93  along with calls for recompense expressed at the high-political level in media 
statements, has however created increasing levels of frustration and bewilderment in Brussels. 
What has become apparent from interviews and the baseline documents reviewed is that the 
EU, as an institution operating on behalf of and through the direction of its member states, may 
be at a disadvantage in this partnership; in many ways the EU is divorced from any kind of 
emotional attachment that may otherwise be associated with the singular parameters of the 
state, whose purview it is to inspire emotion, nationalism and in South Africa’s historical 
context, Africanist ideologies of solidarity. 
From the South African perspective, based on interviews garnered, the strategic partnership 
appears to mean something quite different. It would appear that there is a more visceral 
attachment to the definition of ‘strategic’ in its partnership with the EU. In this sense it could 
be said that South Africa seeks to put the humanity back into ‘institution’. 
It would also seem that South Africa – at least at one ‘operational’ level – is anxious to be seen 
as ‘special’ (or preferential) rather than as instrumentally ‘strategic’ in relation to or with other 
groups of countries.94 At another distinct ‘high-political’ level, however, it would seem that 
South Africa has a wish to align itself with a larger African context, and one rooted in a past 
associated with solidarity, unity, and a greater African identity. At this level, Pretoria would 
appear to have eschewed understandings of the shared values and interests originally spelt out 
and strived for in the strategic partnership, the most contentious being commitment to 
international rules-based structures such as the International Criminal Court, as discussed in 
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greater detail elsewhere in this special issue. In short, the principles of human rights, apparently 
ignored through South Africa’s commitment to African solidarity and its rejection of its 
obligations to identified Western judicial structures, have not altogether precluded the 
operation of the strategic partnership overall.  
Conclusion	
This article takes the perspective that as a dynamic relationship, the EU-South Africa Strategic 
Partnership exhibits not end points owing to differences, but rather a longer term partnership 
able to weather the changing perspectives of the partners.  
How the strategic partnership is understood, whether construed as a domestic political tool, or 
a structural geopolitical one, it remains an important conduit between South Africa and the EU. 
It is apparent through the working of the strategic partnership that divergences of values, 
interests, and vision happen. The continued collaboration between the EU and South Africa 
through at the operational level (political, trade, economic and other issues, development 
cooperation) shows the willingness to persevere in the partnership in areas of converging 
interests, in an international arena fraught with opposing tensions. From the EUs perspective, 
South Africa as a leader in Africa and an emerging economy will remain on the EUs radar. In 
spite of recent developments such as Brexit, South Africa cannot afford to be left out of 
whatever form the EU may take in the future, or indeed be left on the periphery of ensuing 
processes. If South Africa wishes to take on a greater role in the international arena, or as a 
leader on the continent as its foreign policy suggests, the EU will remain an important strategic 
partner. 
Considering the term ‘strategic’, one has to assume that the binding principles of that qualifier 
have some merit in describing the quality of interactions and behaviour. From the EUs 
perspective, this is precisely the point: the EU appears to expect a certain amount of 
convergence in approaches and partnering (collective action) in projects, especially as the EU 
relates to Africa. South Africa, as part of the EUs external environment, has taken on a 
particular strategic dimension in the pursuance of Brussels  interests, which include peace, 
stability, and prosperity, or at least directed development leading to those. The EU has 
employed a particular economic-driven model of development based on a certain neoliberal 
worldview. In the past, South Africa, emerging as a new democracy, shared these vision and 
aims. This has changed in the past ten years, however, and while the EU has tried to 
accommodate South Africa’s domestic developmental challenges in successive country 
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strategy papers and MIPs, as well as through the TDCA and the Dialogue Facility, diverging 
ideological visions of South Africa’s future in Africa, and of how it goes about achieving that 
have begun to emerge.  
The fact is that South Africa’s African Agenda and arguably its pro-African narrative are of 
strategic value to both the EU and South Africa. So, even as the EU openly remonstrates with 
South Africa over its policy rhetoric , this fact has provided the strategic partnership overall 
with the flexibility to continue at the operational level and conversely to ‘use’ each other’s 
ideas of strategic value to an advantage. 
In short, South Africa’s foreign policy is becoming increasingly informed by a resurgence of 
pan-Africanism as South Africa increasingly reconnects with an African narrative more 
broadly.  Pretoria will become increasingly ‘strategic’ with regards to the continent.  The EU 
remains an important partner in functional areas of interest.  Ten years into the EU-South 
African Strategic Partnership, the two would be well advised to take the future of their 
partnership more seriously.  
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